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Feast or Flee:  Government Payments and Labor Migration from 
Agriculture in the United States 
 
Abstract 
 Government payments have been a part of agriculture since 1933 and 
at no time has the government stated a policy objective of decreasing the 
agricultural labor force.  The reality of the matter may be considerably 
different. Using time series data and new econometric techniques, this study 
finds agricultural policy may have an unintended impact on labor migration. 
Specifically, we find that government payments increased labor migration 
from the farm. From 1939 to 2007, increased direct government payments 
resulted in greater migration of labor from agriculture.  Government policy 
appears to have shown limited success at sustaining the agricultural labor 
force. 
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Feast or Flee:  Government Payments and Labor Migration from 
Agriculture in the United States 
 
Introduction 
 The government has provided financial assistance to farmers since the 
1930’s.  The various programs suggested by policymakers are often proposed 
under the moniker of preserving the farm family.  Attempts to uphold this 
way of life have been in the face of rapid industrial growth, dramatic 
technological advance, sharp population growth, and a rise in relative wages 
off-farm.  These changes over past decades have impacted all sectors of the 
economy including agriculture.  According to Mishra, El-Osta, and Gillespie 
(2009), if the purpose of farm policy is to raise farmers’ income and standard 
of living, then policy provisions need to be reconsidered as changes occur in 
farm households and businesses.      
Today, off-farm income is approximately six times greater than cash 
farm income and comprises nearly 80% of total household income (Mishra et 
al. 2002; El-Osta, Mishra, and Morehart 2008). Off-farm labor is no longer 
classified as transitional but rather the primary source of income for farm 
households.  Considering the nature of government payments remained 
relatively unchanged until the development of decoupled payments in the 
1996 Farm Bill, the performance of government programs in achieving their 
stated goals is unclear.   
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Considerable research has focused on the effects of government 
payments on the labor allocation decisions of farm operators and spouses 
(Ahearn and El-Osta 1992; Ahearn, El-Osta, and Dewbre 2006; El-Osta, 
Mishra, and Ahearn 2004; Mishra and Goodwin 1997; Goodwin and Mishra 
2004). These studies have largely been cross-sectional in nature and often 
used farm-level data. Results from the above studies indicate that increased 
government payments, particularly decoupled payments (direct payments), 
decreased the number of hours worked off-farm by operators—essentially 
reinforcing the wealth effect.  
 Only a few studies have focused on how government payments have 
affected the migration of labor from a macroeconomic perspective. Barkley 
(1990) while studying the effect of government payments on labor migration 
concludes that total government payments have no effect on the migration of 
labor from agriculture from 1940 to 1985. His results are inconsistent with 
the findings obtained in the micro-level analysis (farm-level data) of U.S. 
farm households (Dewbre and Mishra 2007; El-Osta, Mishra, and Ahearn 
2004).  
The objective of this paper is to re-assess the impact of government 
payments on agricultural labor migration in the United States.  Specifically, 
the primary research question is presented by the following null and 
alternative hypotheses: 
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Ho:  Increased direct government payments has had no effect on the  
 migration of labor from agriculture.   
Ha:  Increased direct government payments has altered the migration  
 of labor from agriculture.   
 Our results provide evidence for rejecting the null and indicate that 
increased government payments are positively correlated with greater 
migration of labor from agriculture from 1939 to 2007.  A shrinking 
agricultural labor force is certainly not desirable by policymakers’ standards 
and lends supports the proposition that policy provisions have not been 
adequately reconsidered as changes have occurred in farm households and 
businesses.  There is evidence to suggest longstanding programs designed for 
conservation and commodity buyouts may be attributable to migration from 
agriculture (Snell 2005; Gardner 1999; USDA 2010; Edwards and DeHaven 
2001).  More recent trends in agricultural programs, like decoupling of 
payments, may also be credited with the out-migration of labor (El-Osta, 
Mishra, and Morehart 2008).   
Background and Conceptual Model 
Direct government payments in the U.S. began modestly in the early 
1930’s and remained relatively stable through the 1960’s (see figure 1). With 
the passage of the 1973 Farm Bill direct government payments began an 
upward climb. Today, an average of $18.2 billion is distributed annually by 
the federal government to farmers in the form of direct government 
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payments. These payments comprise nearly 30% of farm net income on 
average (USDA 2009) and include fixed direct payments, emergency/disaster 
payments, commodity programs, counter-cyclical payments, marketing loan 
benefits, tobacco transition payments, and conservation program payments.     
 A comprehensive list of programs included in direct government 
payments is presented in Table 1, both preceding and following the 1996 
Farm Bill. The 1996 Farm Bill legislation established production flexibility 
contract (PFC) payments and significantly altered the manner in which 
payments are distributed to farmers. The 2002 Farm Bill later reclassified 
PFC payments as fixed direct or decoupled government payments. Figure 2 
shows the prominence of decoupled payments, especially in 1996 and 1997, 
when decoupled payments accounted for 81% of direct government payments. 
While the share of decoupled payments has declined in recent years, the 
average has remained relatively stable at $5.244 billion (see Table 2). 
Together, the average amount of marketing loan gains, loss deficiency 
payments (LDP), and ad hoc emergency payments are approximately equal to 
decoupled payments but exhibit greater variation.  
The components of direct government payments from 1939 to 1996 are 
also presented in Table 1. From 1961 to 1996, crop specific payments 
averaged about 70% of total direct government payments. Feed grains 
comprised a maximal share of 56% of direct payments in 1965 and minimal 
share of 4% in 1984.  Table 3 provides additional summary statistics on the 
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four largest components of direct government payments prior to 1996. While 
feed grain payments were the primary component of direct government 
payments from 1961-1996, significant resources were also devoted to 
conservation and miscellaneous payments over this period. Conservation and 
miscellaneous payments were also significant sources of variability for this 
period.   
 Coinciding with the trends in direct government payments has been a 
steady migration of labor from agriculture. Bloom and Freeman (1988) 
document the shift in labor forces of developing countries from agriculture to 
industry and service sectors during the period of 1965 to 1985.  In the U.S., 
farm labor has declined over 50% in just under 50 years, from total 
employment of 5.5 million in 1960 to 2.1 million in 2007 (U.S. Department of 
Labor 2009). Cochrane (1993) describes a structural change in U.S. 
agriculture. He notes a long-run trend of declining inputs of human labor and 
increasing inputs of mechanical power/machinery. This trend still holds in 
agriculture domestically and abroad, thereby resulting in downward pressure 
on agricultural labor. Prior studies using a time series approach have 
provided little evidence of a significant relationship between direct 
government payments and migration of labor from agriculture. Barkley 
(1990) found there was no significant relationship between migration from 
agriculture and total direct government payments.  
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 A theoretical model for labor migration was originally proposed by 
Mundlak (2000) and further developed by Barkley (1990), where an 
individual exists in a two-sector economy and faces a decision to allocate 
labor to agriculture or non-agriculture. The individual will migrate from 
agriculture to the non-agricultural sector if their expected discounted utility 
from non-agricultural employment is greatest. Specifically, let us assume 
that the indirect utility functions for an individual   is evaluated for the 
conditions in agriculture and non-agriculture by   ( ) and   ( ), respectively, 
and introduce an index function   that takes on value 0 or 1 to be determined 
by:  
[  ( )    ( )]   (   )    (1) 
In equation 1, if the first term is positive then the individual benefits from 
migration and the function    (   ) takes on a value 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Potential migrants must estimate the probability of obtaining a job in 
nonagricultural sector. This probability is incorporated into the empirical 
model through inclusion of variables like non-agricultural unemployment 
rate and relative size of the sectoral labor force. Finally, economic conditions 
within the agricultural sector, such as, government payments to farmers and 
farmland values are also expected to affect the flow of labor out of 
agriculture. On the other hand, labor can also migrate into agriculture and 
can be represented as: 
[  ( )    ( )]   (   )    (2) 
8 
 
Summing equation 1 and 2 yields the number of migrants: 
 (   )  ∑    (   )
  
  ∑    (   )
  
  (3) 
In equation 3, (   ) is a function of the arguments of the indirect utility 
functions in the two sectors ( (   )) and is also a function of the size of the 
labor force in the origin. The number of migrants generated by the same 
economic environment characterized by (   )
 
will vary by the size of the 
labor force and its sectoral composition. A larger labor force in agriculture 
results in greater potential for migration. Similarly, larger the labor market 
in the destination, the easier it should be for the new migrants to find 
employment. Finally, labor force can be introduced in equation 3 while 
maintaining the constant-returns-to-scale property with respect to the 
sectoral labor: 
 ( )   (   )  ( )
       ( )
                  0 ≤   ≤ 1  (4) 
where   ( ) and     ( ) are the labor force in agriculture and non-agriculture, 
respectively. After dividing both sides of equation 4 by   (   ), the 
migration as a proportion of agricultural labor is represented by   (
 
  
)  the 
sectoral labor ratio by   (
    
  
)  and the ratio of sectoral income by   
(
    
  
). When (   ) the sectoral incomes are equal and no migration takes 
place. However, due to cost associated with migration ( )  there are reasons 
to believe that migration will stop when (   ). 
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Data and Empirical Model 
 In addition to the explanatory variable for government payments, 
controls for the relative size of the agricultural labor force, probability of 
obtaining work off-farm, the relative returns to working off-farm, and 
farmers’ expectations for the future of agriculture were also included in the 
model.  The time-series data used for this research was collected from 
multiple sources and covers the years 1939 to 2007.  First was the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), a monthly survey collected by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS).  It is important to note that there were several changes in 
variable definitions and survey methods for the CPS over the period of study. 
Dummy variables were included for these years to control for these 
transitional periods.  Three of the years in which the survey methodology 
changed were found significant (1972, 1978, and 2000).    
 The CPS was the source for the employment data used to calculate the 
dependent variable, labor migration, and the explanatory variable 
representing the probability of obtaining work off-farm.  An empirical 
measure of outmigration follows the work of Mundlak (1979) where labor 
migration is limited to occupational migration at the aggregate level. In 
particular, migration from the agricultural sector is defined as the percentage 
change in agricultural employment from one year, say (t-1) to the next year 
(t). Here the definition considers only changes in the number of jobs in the 
farm agricultural sector. In particular, the dependent variable is defined as: 
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 (5) 
where        is total agricultural employment in previous year (t-1) and      is 
the total agricultural employment in current year (t).2  Also provided by the 
CPS was the annual non-farm, unemployment rate (U) used as a proxy for the 
probability of obtaining off-farm work. As the probability of obtaining a job 
off-farm falls (unemployment increases), the migration of labor from 
agriculture is expected to decrease.     
Data on direct government payments, net farm income, and nominal 
land values are from the “Farm Income Data” produced by the Economic 
Research Service (ERS) (USDA 2009). Land values are then deflated using 
the Producer Price Index (PPI) for Farm Equipment (U.S. Department of 
Labor 2009) to obtain the real land values (    ). This inflation measure is 
used rather than the PPI for farm products because, like equipment, 
farmland is a capital input in the production process. Assuming efficient land 
markets, the real land value represents farmers’ expectations for the future 
of the agricultural sector.  The real land price is the present value of all 
expected future cash flows; therefore, greater belief in the future of 
agriculture will increase the expected future cash flows and thereby increase 
land values. 
 Government payments (   ) is defined as,  
                                                          
2
 Although Mishra et al. 2002 point out that part-time farming is becoming a permanent 
feature in American agriculture, due to data limitations this development is ignored in this 
study.  
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  (6) 
The Gov ratio measures government payments as a proportion of the annual 
net farm income (Barkley 1990). One potential issue with this definition of 
government payments is the accuracy of net farm income. Questions arise 
from the manner in which farm operators are generally compensated and the 
disincentive that arises from reporting net farm income on an annual basis. 
First, operators generally are compensated by an “owner’s draw” paid from 
the farm profits. Secondly, greater pre-tax profits result in large tax 
liabilities; therefore, when faced with the decision of paying additional taxes 
on farm income or spending the farm earnings elsewhere the farmer is 
expected to choose the latter.  
 In light these measurement issues, separate models with alternative 
definitions of government payments are estimated in this study. The first 
model follows the definition provided in equation (6). The second simply uses 
direct government payments, thereby assuming net farm income equal to 
one. These models will be referred to in Table 4 as “Gov Ratio” and “Gov 
Pmts”, respectively.  
A measure of the relative returns of working in agriculture compared 
to the non-agricultural sector is included.  The expectation is that as the 
returns to agriculture increase on a relative basis, labor migration from 
agriculture will decrease.  The return to labor in each sector is measured by 
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the average product of labor (   ) in the respective sectors.  As defined by 
Barkley (1990) the returns ratio (   ) is calculated as, 
    
      
    
 
      
    
    
  
⁄  (7) 
The variables        and      represent the average product of labor for the 
non-agricultural and agricultural sectors, respectively.  Specifically, non-
agricultural average product of labor (      ) is defined as the gross domestic 
product from the non-agriculture sector (      ) divided non-agriculture labor 
force (    ).       is defined as the gross domestic product from the 
agriculture sector (    ) divided by the agricultural labor force (  ). Data 
used to calculate        and      is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(U.S. Department of Commerce 2009), while the labor force data for      and 
   is from the CPS.   
 A measure of the relative size of the agricultural and non-agricultural 
labor force is also included.  LF represents the ability of the non-agricultural 
sector to absorb workers from agriculture.  
   
    
  
   (8) 
According to Barkley (1990), as the non-agricultural labor force grows relative 
to the agricultural labor force (LF increases), the non-agricultural sectors of 
the economy are expected to be increasingly able to absorb farm workers.  
Therefore, a positive correlation between LF and m is expected.   
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 A function describing the migration of labor from agriculture can then 
be developed using the time varying explanatory variables, a vector of 
dummy variables (z), and stochastic disturbance term ( ).  
                              (9)    
A semi-logarithmic transformation of the explanatory variables was then 
used and each variable was tested for stationarity via an augmented Dickey-
Fuller test. With exception to the annual unemployment rate, all explanatory 
variables were found non-stationary. Therefore, the first difference (denoted 
by Δ) of the following variables was taken:    (   ),    (   ),    (    ), and 
   (  ). The first differences were stationary but not co-integrated. Using the 
first differences alters the interpretation of the results. Consider the 
government payment variable, greater changes in log government payments 
from (t-1) to (t) will increase/decrease migration of labor from agriculture in 
time (t).  
Prior labor migration models lagged all dependent variables one period 
(Barkley 1990; Mundlak 2000). This was done to decrease the likelihood of 
simultaneity and accounts for the time delay required for farmers to observe, 
process, and formulate expectations. The first difference was not used for the 
non-agricultural unemployment rate so the variable was lagged one period. 
Meaning, the probability of finding off-farm work in the prior period (t-1) 
determines whether the farmer will decide to migrate from agriculture in the 
current period (t).      
14 
 
The migration of labor from agriculture is estimated by ordinary least 
squares (OLS) of the following form, 
                                       (    )   (10) 
       (   )         (   )          (  )        (    )     
This model was estimated using alternative definitions of government 
payments. In each case, migration would be a strictly increasing/decreasing 
function in direct government payments and there will exist a constant 
elasticity (     ), 
  
     (   )
 
  
     
               (
 
 
) (11) 
In addition to estimating the model for the full data set, the model was 
partitioned in two groups, 1939–1995 and 1996–2007, to evaluate the 
importance of decoupled payments on the migration of labor from agriculture. 
In the time-partitioned models, government payments are included as a ratio 
of net farm income as described in equation (6). Following each estimated 
model, the Breush-Godfrey test and residual correlogram were used to test 
for autocorrelation.  
 This model was also estimated as an AR(1), autoregressive distributed 
lag model with      included as an explanatory variable. This approach 
yielded nearly identical results to ordinary least squares (OLS) in terms of 
coefficient estimates and significance. Using OLS allowed for an additional 
year of data to be used relative to the autoregressive model. One drawback to 
using OLS rather than the AR(1) model was evidence of serial correlation for 
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1996-2007, but the magnitude and significance of the coefficient estimates 
were equivalent across models for this time period.  For these reasons, only 
the results using OLS are reported.   
 
Results and Discussion 
The primary result of this research is that increases in government 
payments result in increased migration of labor from agriculture (Table 4).  
This result is consistent using both definitions of government payments 
(column 2 and 3). These definitions produced nearly identical results; 
although, the government payment ratio appears to be more robust to serial 
correlation as evidenced by the Breusch-Pagan tests.  
We provide four possibilities for the positive and significant 
relationship between labor migration and farm program payments. The first 
explanation for this result involves increased decoupled payments. Assuming 
off-farm wages are greater than farm wages, a profit maximizing farm 
household may choose to devote greater hours to off-farm work and spend 
their increased income (total) on hiring an additional farm worker. This profit 
maximizing behavior may occur to the extent where farmers and/or spouses 
work full-time off-farm and effectively leave the agriculture labor force. 
Similarly, El-Osta, Mishra, and Morehart (2008) found that a $10,000 
increase in expected government payments increased the probability of the 
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farm operator’s wife working off-farm when she is the only one devoting time 
off-farm. 
 The second explanation for the positive relationship between changes 
in direct government payments and migration from agriculture involve 
commodity buyout programs. From 2002 to 2008, peanut and tobacco quota 
buyouts were introduced. According to Snell (2005), the reaction from farmers 
to these programs was similar in the first year following the legislation. The 
response was a double-digit percentage decline in the number of peanut and 
tobacco acres planted. With steep declines in production, farm operators, 
spouses, and/or hired laborers may have sought employment in the non-
agricultural sector.  
Third, conservation programs have been a part of agricultural policy 
since the 1930’s. In 1985, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was 
established to idle marginally productive farmland, particularly in 
environmentally sensitive areas. According to Gardner (1999), USDA (2010), 
and Edward and DeHaven (2001), nearly 34 million acres of land had been 
idled due to CRP through 2006.  As a result of the retired acreage, there are 
fewer hired laborers needed for production and less acreage for the operator 
to manage, thereby increasing the time available for the farm operator to 
engage in off-farm labor, ceteris paribus.  
Fourth, agricultural labor has also been replaced over time by capital 
and machinery improvements on the farm. Cochrane (1993) describes a 
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structural change in U.S. agriculture resulting from a long-run trend of 
declining inputs of human labor, increasing inputs of mechanical power, 
machinery, and agricultural chemicals. Burfisher and Hopkins (2003) also 
noted a trend of declining labor intensity and increasing capital intensity in 
U.S. agriculture as evidence of the ease of input substitution in the long run. 
If increases in direct government payments are invested in capital 
improvements then migration of labor from agriculture would increase, 
ceteris paribus.  
Considering the possible explanations provided for the relationship 
between direct government payments and labor migration, the impact of the 
1996 Farm Bill’s introduction of the free market concept in agriculture was 
also evaluated. Table 4 shows the estimated coefficients for the model from 
1939-1995 and 1996-2007 (column 4 and 5, table 4). Using a Chow test, the 
null hypothesis of equality between the coefficient estimates for the change in 
direct government payments for 1939-1995 and full model (column 2 and 3) 
could not be rejected. Conversely, the coefficient estimate for 1996-2007 was 
not statistically significant.  We can conclude that the 1996 Farm Bill did not 
significantly alter the impact of government payment on the migration of 
labor from agriculture.    
The change in log real land values and return ratio were both found 
insignificant across all models. This result was surprising considering the 
results of Barkley (1990), who found the relationship between migration and 
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the return ratio positive and highly significant, meaning increases in non-
agricultural returns, ceteris paribus, entice farm worker to leave the 
agricultural sector. The results of the current research show that larger 
changes in returns ratio do not have a significant impact on migration. Real 
land values were also meant to capture the expectations future conditions in 
the agricultural sector, assuming efficient land markets hold. Therefore, 
changes in the log expectations of farmers were not found to have a 
significant impact on labor migration.       
The log change in the labor force ratio (     ) is positive and 
significantly correlated with migration of labor from agriculture in all 
models, meaning that larger increases in the log labor force ratio result in 
greater absorption of agricultural labor into the off-farm labor force and 
hence increased migration from agriculture.  Additionally, the non-farm 
unemployment rate (       ) is negative and significantly correlated with 
migration of labor from agriculture. When the non-farm unemployment rate 
increases, farm workers’ prospect for off-farm labor diminishes and the rate 
of migration from agriculture declines. Additionally, the constant and all 
dummy variables were found significant for the model using the government 
payment ratio.  
Conclusions  
The results of this research indicated that government payments have 
had a positive influence on farm operators, spouses, and hired workers 
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leaving the agriculture labor force from 1939 to 2007.  Perhaps this is due to 
the direct consequence of conservation programs, commodity buyouts, 
decoupling of payments, or the substitution effect of lower cost capital as 
well. Perhaps changes in economic conditions for both the non-farm and farm 
sectors have occurred at such a continuous, rapid, and unpredictable pace 
that policymakers have been unable to modernize policy quickly enough to 
increase the standard of living in the farm economy. 
Regardless, it is encouraging from a policy perspective that the positive 
relationship between labor migration and government payments has 
diminished in recent years. This could be a sign of more effective government 
policy and a sign of increased initiatives designed to promote a more 
sustainable agricultural labor force. Consider the inclusion of initiatives 
aimed at young and beginning farmers in the 2008 Farm Bill, such as the 
Beginning Farmer and Rancher Development Program, Down-Payment Loan 
Program, and the Beginning and Socially Disadvantaged Farm and Rancher 
Land Contract Payment (Iowa State University 2009).  
These programs are in response to a concerning trend in agriculture, 
the aging of the farm population which threatens to further weaken the 
industry over the long-term. According to Gale (1994), entry into farming by 
the ‘next generation’ holds a place of central importance in the determination 
of industry structure and the total number of farmers and farm families. 
Currently, these young and beginning farmers are receiving a minority share 
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of direct government payments. Mishra et al (2002) shows government 
assistance is most often received by large, wealthier farms that are less likely 
to work off-farm. More effective government policy could be a viable option to 
slow the drift of younger, more educated workers from the farm labor force 
and preserve the next generation of farmers’ migration from agriculture.       
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Figure 1:  Direct Governemnt Payments (1939-2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Direct Government Payments (1996-2008)  
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Table 1:  Definition of Direct Government Payment before and after 
1996 
1939 to 1995 1996 to 2007 
Feed Grain, Wheat, Rice Cotton, and 
Wool  (Crop Specific) Program 
Payments 
Production Flexibility Contract 
(PFC)/Fixed Direct Payments 
Conservation Program Payments Counter-cyclical Payments 
Miscellaneous Programs3 Marketing Loan Gains 
 Loan Deficiency Payments (LDP) 
 Certificate Exchange Gains 
 Peanut Quota Buyouts 
 Milk Income Loss Payments 
 Tobacco Transition 
 Conservation Program 
 Ad Hoc Emergency Program 
 Miscellaneous Programs4 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
3 Miscellaneous programs from 1939-1949 are attributed to the Sugar Act, 
Price Adj and Parity, and Wartime Production/Subsidy.  From 1950-1955, 
Miscellaneous payments were relatively low and source unknown.  From 
1956-1970 payments are completely attributable to the Soil Bank Program 
(ended in 1971) and from 1971-1996 include all other programs.  From 1990 -
1996, loan deficiency payments and marketing loan gains were included in 
Miscellaneous Payments   
 
4 Miscellaneous programs (post 1996) include Acreage Grazing Payments, 
Additional Interest Payments, American Indian Livestock Feed Program, 
American Indian Livestock Feed Program--Apportioned, DCC--Fruit 
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Table 2:  Summary statistics for various components of Direct 
Government Payment (1996-2007), (millions of $) 
Government Program Mean Std Dev 
Coefficient 
of 
Variation 
Decoupled Payments 5,244.37 751.42 0.14 
Counter-cyclical Payments 1,044.05 1,502.19 1.44 
Marketing Loans and LDP's 2,671.37 2,822.27 1.06 
Certificate Exchange Gains 595.94 605.17 1.02 
Peanut, Milk, and Tobacco 
Payments 
676.06 799.61 1.18 
Conservation Programs 2,206.77 592.06 0.27 
Ad Hoc Emergency Programs 3,064.11 3,223.47 1.05 
Total 15,431.89 5,801.80 0.38 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Summary statistics for various components of Direct 
Government Payment (1961-1995), (millions of $) 
Government Program Mean Std Dev 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
Feed Grains 1,863.86 1,907.34 1.02 
Wheat 980.53 828.38 0.84 
Conservation Programs 479.10 572.97 1.20 
Misc Programs 692.85 1,133.87 1.64 
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Table 4: Parameter estimates of labor migration from agriculture 
Variable Gov Pmts Gov Ratio 1939-1995 1996-2007 
       0.0086** 0.0106*** 0.0105** 0.0015 
(0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0087) 
      0.6875*** 0.6771*** 0.6973*** 0.7733*** 
(0.0491) (0.0489) (0.0533) (0.1507) 
        -0.0508 -0.0521 -0.0542 -0.0237 
(0.0333) (0.0325) (0.0368) (0.0684) 
       0.0070 -0.0086 0.0069 -0.0163 
(0.0117) (0.0136) (0.0166) (0.0219) 
       -0.0219*** -0.0214*** -0.0210*** -0.0473* 
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0233) 
       -0.0226* -0.0220* -0.0193  
(0.0131) (0.0128) (0.0136)  
       -0.0285** -0.0285** -0.0264*  
(0.0132) (0.0129) (0.0134)  
       0.0358* 0.0346* 0 -0.0043 
(0.0181) (0.0178) 0 (0.0376) 
Constant -0.0710*** -0.0692*** -0.0698*** -0.1464* 
(0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0676) 
N 68 68 56 12 
R2 0.913 0.916 0.849 0.996 
Breusch–Godfrey (p-value) 0.1083 0.1532 0.3442 0.0022 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
